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A VOICE FOR THE FISH? CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION AND POTENTIAL CAUSES OF
ACTION FOR IMPACTS UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT
Dr. William C.G. Burns*
The seas-all the seas-cry for regulation as a veritable res
communis omnium.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change litigation has been transformed from a
creative lawyering strategy to a major force in transnational
regulatory governance of greenhouse gas emissions over the
last couple of years. Several actions related to climate
change have been initiated in national courts and regulatory
agencies in several countries,' as well as two actions in
* Senior Fellow, Santa Clara University School of Law, Santa Clara,
California, wburns@scu.edu, 408.551.3000 x6139. Ph.D., International
Environmental Law, University of Wales-Cardiff School of Law.
1. Louis Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-or Break-
International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 136 (1971).
2. Actions have been brought in U.S. courts, inter alia, under the Clean Air
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and common law nuisance theories,
as well as agency action under the Endangered Species Act. This includes the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438
(2007), rev'g, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In Massachusetts v. EPA, twelve
states and several cities and nongovernmental organizations filed an action
against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), challenging its denial
of a petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. See id. at 1446. The U.S. Supreme
Court held for the plaintiffs, concluding that the EPA had authority to regulate
such emissions and that the agency must ground its reason for action or
inaction in the terms of the Act. See id. at 1463. For excellent overviews of U.S.
actions to date see Michael B. Gerrard, Survey of Climate Change Litigation,
283(63) N.Y.L.J. 1-2 (2007); JUSTIN R. PIDOT, GLOBAL WARMING IN THE COURTS
1-22 (2006),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/currentresearch/documents/GlobalWarmi
ngLit CourtsReport.pdf. Actions have also been brought in German, Canadian,
Australian, and Nigerian courts. For a summary of these cases, consult the
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international fora: the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights3 and the World Heritage Committee.4
Climate Justice website, http'/www.climatelaw.org.
3. In December of 2005, the Inuit people of Canada and Alaska filed a
petition against the United States before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. See Inuit Circumpolar Council, Petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States,
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf
(last visited Mar.. 23, 2008). The petition contends that the impacts of climate
change on the Inuit people caused by acts and omissions of the United States in
failing to meet its international legal obligations to not cause transboundary
harm, as well as violation of treaty obligations under the UNFCCC and other
agreements, violate the human rights of the Inuit people. The petition calls on
the Commission to prepare a report recommending that the United States, inter
alia: Adopt mandatory measures to limit its greenhouse gas emissions; Take
into account the impact of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions on Arctic and Inuit
before approving major government policies; Establish a plan to protect Inuit
culture and resources. See Inuit Circumpolar Council, Summary of the Petition,
http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-
files/FINALPetitionSummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). In December
2006, the Inter-American Commission declined to rule on the petition. Letter
from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Sec'y, Organization of American
States, to Paul Crowley, Legal Rep. (Nov. 16, 2006), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/science/l6commissionletter.pdf (last
visited on Mar. 23, 2008)
4. See Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, Urge UNESCO to Review
Climate Change Petitions, http://www.elaw.org/campaigns/info.asp?id=2929
(last visited July 3, 2005). Between 2004-2006, non-governmental organizations
from several countries filed petitions with the World Heritage Committee to
protect five sites that are classified as World Heritage sites under the
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, 11 I.L.M. 1358 (1972) [hereinafter World Heritage
Convention]: the Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System, the Huarascdn National
Park in Peru, the Sagarmatha National Park in Nepal, the Great Barrier Reef
in Australia and Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park in the United
States and Canada. The respective petitions requested that the World Heritage
Committee designate these sites as "In Danger" under Article 11(4) of the
Convention as a consequence of the threat posed by climate change. See
petitions at: http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/topic/unesco/ (last visited on Mar.
23, 2008). The listing of a site under Article 11(4) mandates the development of
a "programme of corrective action." See WORLD HERITAGE COMM.,
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD HERITAGE
CONVENTION, § 186 (2005),
http://whc.unesco.orgarchive/opguide05-en.pdf. The petitioners requested, inter
alia, that the corrective measures include greenhouse gas reduction measures
by major greenhouse gas emitting Parties. See Belize Inst. of Envtl. Law &
Policy, Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Belize
Barrier Reserve System in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of
Climate Change and for Protective Measures and Actions, at 30 Nov. 15, 2004),
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/unesco/belize-petition.doc;
Forum for Prot. of Pub. Interest, Petition to the World Heritage Committee
Requesting Inclusion of the Huascaran National Park in the List of World
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This article examines another potential international
forum in which the threat of climate change might be
addressed: The Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 10
Dec. 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks
(UNFSA).5 Actions under UNFSA could be salutary for
several reasons. First, the commercial fisheries sector may be
profoundly and adversely affected by climate change.' This
includes many fish stocks regulated under UNFSA: highly
migratory species, which have wide geographic distribution
and undertake significant migrations,7 and straddling stocks,
Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change, at 41 (Nov. 17, 2004),
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/unesco/peru-petition.doc. The
World Heritage Committee considered the petitions at its twenty-ninth session
in Durban, South Africa in July 2005. It requested that the regime's World
Heritage Centre establish a working group of experts, including the petitioners,
to review the nature and scales of risks to World Heritage sites associated with
climate change and to develop a strategy to assist the Convention's Parties to
implement appropriate management responses. The working group was tasked
with reporting back at the thirtieth session in 2006. At its thirtieth session, the
Committee decided not to list the sites listed in the petitions as "in Danger," and
also rejected a request to encourage the Parties to draw on projections from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change when assessing risks to World
Heritage Sites. See Heritage Body "No" to Carbon Cuts, BBC NEWS, July 10,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5164476.stm. The Committee
did, however, adopt a "Strategy to Assist States Parties to Implement
Appropriate Management Responses" to climate change and urged the Parties
to the World Heritage Convention to implement the Strategy. Moreover, the
Committee decided that World Heritage sites could be inscribed on the List of
World Heritage in Danger on a case-by-case basis, but also called for a study on
alternatives to such listings. See UNESCO World Heritage Centre, World
Heritage Committee Adopts Strategy on Heritage and Climate Change, Jul. 10,
2006, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/262.
5. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, July 24 - Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
6. See infra Part A.
7. See Pacific Fishery Management Council, Background: Highly
Migratory Species (2005), http://www.pcouncil.org/hms/hmsback.html. Highly
migratory species include many species of tuna and tuna-like species, oceanic
sharks, mackerel, sauries, pomfrets, swordfish, marlin, and sailfish. See S.M.
GARCIA, WORLD REVIEW OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES AND STRADDLING
STOCKS, UN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, FAO FISHERIES
TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 337 (1994),
http://www.fao.orgdocrep/003/T3740E/T3740E00.htm; NOAA Fisheries Office of
Sustainable Fisheries, Highly Migratory Species,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
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which occur both within and beyond Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs).8 Overall, "[m]igratory and straddling species
account for roughly 20 percent of the total marine catch and
include some of the most economically valuable fish
populations."9
Second, the United States, one of the world's largest
emitters of greenhouse gases"° and a State with an abject
record in addressing climate change, was one of the first
nations to ratify UNFSA, 11 and has played an active
leadership role in its implementation.12  UNFSA thus
presents an excellent forum in which to engage the United
States and other major greenhouse gas emitters, including
the European Union and China, on climate issues. Finally,
unlike the other international fora where climate change
actions have been pursued to date, UNFSA provides a dispute
resolution mechanism with teeth.13
8. See GARCIA, supra note 7. Overall, about 200 species have been
identified as highly migratory species or straddling stocks species. See FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF
WORLD HIGHLY MIGRATORY STRADDLING AND OTHER HIGH SEAS FISHERY
RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED SPECIES 2, FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER NO.
495 (2006), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/a0653e/AO653EO1.pdf. "Most
typically, such stocks frequent the localized edges of wide continental shelves,
e.g., the 'Flemish Cap' in the northwest Atlantic, or the continental slopes .....
Jamison E. Colburn, Turbot Wars, Straddling Stocks, Regime Theory, and a
New U.N. Agreement, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 323, 327 (1997).
9. W.M. von Zharen, The Shrinking Sea and Expanding Sovereignty: The
Fate of Fisheries, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 24, 26 (2000).
10. In 2006, China's greenhouse gas emissions surpassed those of the
United States. See Press Release, Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, Chinese C02 in Perspective (June 22, 2007),
http://www.mnp.nl'en/service/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emission
sinperspective.html. However, the United States is still responsible for
approximately a quarter of the world's cumulative greenhouse gas emissions
over the past century. See Kevin A. Baumert & Nancy Kete, Climate Issue
Brief, World Resources Institute, at 1 (2001). Additionally, U.S. per capita
emissions are approximately ten times those of China. See id. at 2.
11. See Note, Fisheries: United States Ratifies Agreement on Highly
Migratory and Straddling Stocks, 8 COLO. J. INTL ENVTL. L. & POLY 78, 80
(1996).
12. David A. Balton & Holly R. Koehler, Reviewing the United Nations Fish
Stocks Treaty, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 5, 5-6 (2006), available at
http'//www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2006/O6fall.pdf?rd= 1.
13. See infra sec. D.2. By contrast, under the American Convention on the
Rights of Man, which is invoked in the Inuit's petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission's only recourse,
should it find the United States to have violated the human rights of the Inuit,
is to issue a report outlining conclusions and non-binding recommendations.
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An article of this length necessarily cannot discuss all of
the intricate scientific and legal issues that an action of this
nature would invoke; rather it seeks to lay a foundation for
further research and discussion. In this pursuit this article
will: 1) Provide an overview of climate change science; 2)
Examine the exigency that has spurred climate change
litigation: the inadequacy of international and national
responses to climate change; 3) Outline the potential impacts
of climate change on fish species, with an emphasis on the
potential impacts on highly migratory fish species and
straddling stocks; 4) Provide an overview of UNFSA and
potential actions for climate change damages under the
Agreement; and 5) Briefly discuss potential barriers to such
actions.
A. Overview of Climate Change Science
The most recent assessment by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)14 concluded that average
global surface temperatures have increased by 0.76°C since
1850, with the linear warming trend over the past fifty years
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What is the IACHR?,
http://www.cidh.org/what.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). Because the United
States is not a member of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, the
Commission cannot refer the case to the Court for a binding decision. See id.
Similarly, even if the World Heritage Convention were to list World Heritage
sites threatened by climate change on its "in danger" list in the future, this
would trigger little more than the potential for financial assistance to address
the threats under the Convention. See WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, supra
note 4, at 11(4).
14. The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization
and the United Nations Environment Program in 1988 to review and assess the
most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information related to the
understanding of climate change, to evaluate proposals for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, and to assess the viability of response mechanisms. See G.A.
Res. 43/53, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 6, 1988), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm. The IPCC provides
comprehensive Assessment Reports of the current knowledge and future
projections of climate change at regular intervals. See generally IPCC Reports,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm. The reports are
authored by teams of authors from throughout the world from universities,
research centers, businesses and non-governmental organizations. See id.
There were more than 800 contributing authors to the latest report, and more
than 2500 scientific expert reviewers of the report. See id. The First
Assessment Report was published in 1990, the Second Assessment Report in
1995, the Third Assessment Report was released in 2001, and the Fourth
Assessment Report (designated as AR4) was in four volumes throughout 2007.
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twice that of the past century. 15  Moreover, the assessment
concluded that "Imlost of the observed increase in globally
averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas concentrations."16 This Section provides an
overview of the scientific understanding of the growth and
impact of greenhouse gases.
The surface of the Earth is heated by solar radiation
emanating from the sun at short wavelengths between 0.15
and 5 lim. Each square meter of the Earth receives an
average of 342 watts of solar radiation throughout the year. 7
Approximately 26% of this radiation is reflected or scattered
back to space by clouds and other atmospheric particles, and
another 19% is absorbed by clouds, gases and atmospheric
particles."8 Fifty-five percent of incoming solar energy passes
through the atmosphere. Four percent is reflected from the
surface back to space, so 51% reaches the Earth's surface.
The heating of Earth's surfaces causes re-radiation of
approximately one third of this energy in the form of long-
wave band (wavelengths of 3-50 pm), or "infrared,"
radiation.19
Some of the outgoing infrared radiation is absorbed by
15. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 5
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf. Atmospheric
temperatures have been rising at a rate of approximately 0.2°C per decade over
the past thirty years. See Declaration of James E. Hansen, Green Mountain
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep et al. v. Torti, Nos. 2:05-CV-302 & 2:05-CV-304
(D. Vt. Aug. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-jehl/case for-vermont.pdf.
16. IPCC, supra note 15, at 10; see also Richard Somerville et al., Historical
Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 105 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4wgl/ar4-wgl-chapterl.pdf
("[H]uman activities have become a dominant force, and are responsible for
most of the warming observed over the past 50 years . . ."). The IPCC defines
the term "very likely" as a greater than 90% likelihood of occurrence/outcome.
See id. at 121.
17. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO
THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 89 (2001) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001 - SCIENTIFIC].
18. See PhysicalGeography.net, The Greenhouse Effect,
http://www.physicalgeography.nettfundamentals/7h.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
19. See Somerville, supra note 16, at 96.
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naturally occurring atmospheric gases: principally water
vapor (H 20), but also carbon dioxide (C0 2), ozone (03),
methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N 20), and clouds. 20  This
absorption is termed the "natural greenhouse effect" because
these gases, which are termed "greenhouse gases," operate
much like a greenhouse. They are "transparent" to incoming
short-wave radiation, but "opaque" to outgoing infrared
radiation, which causes them to trap a substantial portion of
such radiation and re-radiate much of this energy to the
Earth's surface, thereby increasing surface temperatures.21
While greenhouse gases comprise only 1% of the
atmosphere,22 they are critical to the sustenance of life on
Earth because they elevate surface temperatures by about
330 C.23
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, atmospheric
concentrations of naturally occurring greenhouse gases had
been relatively stable for ten thousand years.24  As a
consequence, the net incoming solar radiation at the top of
the atmosphere was roughly balanced by net outgoing
infrared radiation.2  However, with the advent of fossil fuel
burning plants to support industry, automobiles, and the
energy demands of modern consumers, as well as the
substantial expansion of other human activities, including
agricultural production, "humans began to interfere seriously
in the composition of the atmosphere"26 by emitting large
20. See Thomas R. Karl & Kevin E. Trenberth, Modern Global Climate
Change, 302 Sci. 1719, 1719 (2003).
21. University of California-San Diego, Climate Change Earth & Science
System, General Effect: The Greenhouse Effect,
http://earthguide.ucsd.edu/virtualmuseum/climatechangel/02-l.shtml (last
visited on Mar. 23, 2008).
22. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Secretariat, The Greenhouse Effect and the Carbon Cycle,
http://unfccc.intlessentialbackground/feeling-the-heat/items/2903.php (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
23. See id.
24. See Haroon S. Kheshgi, Steven J. Smith & James A. Edmonds,
Emissions and Atmospheric C0 2 Stabilization, 10 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION
STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 213, 214 (2005).
25. See JOHN R. JUSTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, IB89005: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Aug.
13, 2001), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org(NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim-
2.cfm?&CFID=13638750&CFTOKEN=63020586.
26. Fred Pearce, World Lays Odds On Global Catastrophe, NEW SCIENTIST
INT'L, Apr. 8, 1995, at 4.
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amounts of additional greenhouse gases. The human-driven
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has resulted
in "radiative forcing." That is, increased levels of greenhouse
gases result in greater absorption of outgoing infrared
radiation and ultimately an increase in temperatures when a
portion of this radiation is re-radiated to the Earth's
surface 27
The most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas over
the past two centuries has been carbon dioxide, which is
primarily attributable to fossil fuel combustion,25 cement
production, and land-use change.29  Carbon dioxide has
27. See UNEP, VITAL CLIMATE CHANGE GRAPHICS 10 (2005), available at
http://www.vitalgraphics.net/ documents/clmate-change-update.vl5.pdf.
The earth then is radiating less energy to space than it absorbs from
the sun. This temporary planetary energy imbalance results in the
earth's gradual warming... Because of the large capacity of the oceans
to absorb heat, it takes the earth about a century to approach a new
balance-that if, for it to once again receive the same amount of energy
from the sun it radiates to space. And of course the balance is reset at a
higher temperature.
James Hansen, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb, SCI. AM., Mar. 2004,
at 71.
28. Consumption of crude oil and coal account for almost 77% of fossil fuel
carbon dioxide emissions. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE
SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM FOR FISCAL 2007, at 117 (2007). Energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions have risen 130-fold since 1850. See PEW CTR.
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING AND
RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 34 (2006), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ClimatelOl-FULL 121406_065519.pdf.
"Worldwide use of coal, oil, and natural gas in 2005 led to the emission of about
7.5 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) in C02, an amount that continues to increase
year by year." ROSINA BIERBAUM ET AL., CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE:
AVOIDING THE UNMANAGEABLE AND MANAGING THE UNAVOIDABLE, SCIENTIFIC
EXPERT GROUP REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
12 (2006), http://www.unfoundation.orgfiles/pdf/2007/SEGReport.pdf.
29. "The additional release in recent years from deforestation and land-use
change, mainly in tropical regions, has been estimated variously at between 0.7
GtC/year and 3.0 GtC/year in CO2 ... a mid-range value of 1.5 GtC/year is often
cited." BIERBAUM ET AL., supra note 28, at 12-13. This comprises 20-25% of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. See CHATHAM HOUSE ROYAL SOC'Y
FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS, WORKSHOP ON REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM
TROPICAL DEFORESTATION, SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2007), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/file/9814_160407workshop.pdf, Raymond E.
Gullison et al., Tropical Forests and Climate Change, 316 SCI. 985, 985 (2007).
Deforestation also contributes to warming trends by eliminating possible
increased storage of carbon and decreasing evapotranspiration. See G. Bala et
al., Combined Climate and Carbon-Cycle Effects of Large-Scale Deforestation,
104(16) PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCIENCES 6550, 6550 (2007). However,
deforestation exerts a cooling effect, particularly in seasonally snow-covered
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accounted for 90% or more of the increased greenhouse gas
climate forcing ° in recent years. 1 Since 1751, over 297
billion metric tons of carbon have been released into the
atmosphere from anthropogenic sources, with half of the
emissions occurring since 1978.32 Atmospheric concentrations
of carbon dioxide were approximately 280 parts per million
(ppm) at the start of the Industrial Revolution in the 1780s.
It took a century and a half to reach atmospheric
concentrations of 315 ppm. The trend accelerated in the
Twentieth Century, reaching 360 ppm by the 1990s, and 384
ppm currently,33 which exceeds atmospheric levels for at least
the last 650,000 years,34 and most likely the past twenty
million years. 5
Nitrous oxide emissions, primarily generated through
fertilizer production and industrial processes, account for
approximately 5% of greenhouse gas forcing in recent years. 6
Atmospheric concentrations of nitrous oxides rose from a
value of 270 parts per billion (ppb) prior to the Industrial
Revolution to 319 ppb in 2005. 37
Methane emissions, generated primarily through rice
high latitudes, by decreasing the albedo (reflectivity) of surfaces. See id.
30. The term "forcing" refers to "an imposed change of the planet's energy
balance with space." James Hansen et al., Climate Change and Trace Gases,
365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y A 1925, 1936 (2007).
31. See James Hansen & Makiko Sato, Greenhouse Gas Growth Rates,
101(46) PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCIENCES 16109, 16111 (2004).
32. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH, supra note 28, at 117.
33. See Eric Steig, The Lag between Temperature and C0 2 , REALCLIMATE,
Apr. 27, 2007, available at http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=430.
Approximately half of carbon dioxide emissions since 1751 have occurred since
1978. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH, supra note 28, at 117. Carbon dioxide emissions grew 80%
between 1970 and 2004. See IPCC, WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf [hereinafter MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE].
34. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 4 (2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2febO7.pdf.
35. See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 56 (2007), available at
http://www.securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20
the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf.
36. See Hansen & Sato, supra note 31, at 16111.
37. See IPCC, supra note 15, at 4.
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cultivation, ruminants, energy production, and landfills,
account for approximately 4% of greenhouse gas forcing in
recent years.38 Atmospheric concentrations of methane have
increased 153% from pre-Industrial Revolution levels,
reaching 1774 ppb in 2005. This far exceeds the natural
range of the last 650,000 years. 9 Overall, the global
emissions of the six primary anthropogenic greenhouse gases
rose 70% between 1970 and 2004.40
The increasing emissions translate into tangible human
impacts. The World Health Organization has estimated that
warming and precipitation trends over the past thirty years
associated with anthropogenic climate change have claimed
150,000 lives annually, primarily attributable to human
disease and malnutrition.4 ' Recent studies have linked the
significant increase in violent weather events over the past
several decades to increases in sea surface temperature
associated with climate change. Other expressions of
climate change include "increasing ground instability of
permafrost regions . . .shifts in ranges and changes in algal,
plankton and fish abundance in high-latitude oceans .
[and] poleward and upward shifts in ranges in plant and
animal species .. .
38. See Hansen & Sato, supra note 31, at 16111.
39. See IPCC, supra note 15, at 4. However, methane growth rates have
declined since the early 1990s. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE SYNTHESIS REPORT OF THE
IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 4 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.chlpdf/assessment-report'ar4/syr/ar4-syr-spm.pdf. Overall,
emissions of the six primary greenhouse gases generated by anthropogenic
sources increased 75% between 1970 and 2004. See Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency, Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Increased 75% Since 1970, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.mnp.nlIen.
40. See MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 33, at 3.
41. See Jonathan A. Patz et al., Impact of Regional Climate Change on
Human Health, 438 NATURE 310, 310 (2005).
42. See Greg A. Holland & Peter J. Webster, Heightened Tropical Cyclone
Activity in the North Atlantic: Natural Variability or Climate Trend?, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCIETY A 2695-2716 (2007); Kerry Emanuel, Increasing
Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 436 NATURE 686,
686-88 (2005).
43. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, WORKING GROUP II
CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-reportlar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf [hereinafter
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY].
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Overall, warming is undoubtedly exerting a substantial
and pervasive influence on the globe. As the IPCC recently
concluded, "[o]f the more than 29,000 observational data
series, from 75 studies, that show significant change in many
physical and biological systems, more than 89% are
consistent with the direction of change expected as a response
to warming."44
However, as atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases continue to rise, the greatest trepidation of a climate
scientist lies in the outlook for this century and beyond, as
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases continue to
rise. Absent aggressive global efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide
may reach twice pre-Industrial Revolution levels as early as
2050, 45 and perhaps triple by the end of the century. 6 The
latest assessment by the IPCC projects that doubling
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from pre-
Industrial Revolution levels is likely to cause a 2°-4.5°C
increase in temperature, with a best estimate of 3°C. This
projection is remarkably consistent with paleoclimatic
evidence. "[E]mpirical data climate change over the past
700,000 years yields a climate sensitivity of ° C for each
W/m2 of forcing, or 3°C for a 4 W/m2 forcing."48
Moreover, the IPCC's most recent assessment's mid-
range scenario projects that sea levels will rise between
eighteen and fifty-nine centimeters (7-23 inches) during the
remainder of this century as a consequence of projected
44. IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 43, at 2.
45. See Hansen, supra note 15, at 4.
46. See Stephen F. Lincoln, Fossil Fuels in the 21st Century, 34(8) AMBIO
621, 621 (2005).
47. See IPCC, supra note 15, at 12; see also Bierbaum et al., supra note 29,
at x:
If C02 emissions and concentrations grow according to mid-range
projections, moreover, the global average surface temperature is
expected to rise by 0.2°C to 0.4°C per decade throughout the 21st
century and would continue to rise thereafter. The cumulative warming
by 2100 would be approximately 3°C to 5oC over preindustrial
conditions.
48. Hansen, supra note 15, at 7. As Hansen notes, paleoclimatic data is
particularly compelling because it also includes any cloud feedbacks that may
exist. See id. Cloud feedbacks are recognized by most climatologists as the
largest source of uncertainty in climatic modeling. See IPCC, supra note 15, at
4; Richard A. Kerr, Three Degrees of Consensus, 305 SCI. 932, 933 (2004).
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warming.49 However, there is a very real possibility that sea
levels will rise much more than this because the IPCC
assessment fails to evaluate potential dynamical responses of
ice sheets in Greenland and the West Antarctic,5" which may
exert substantial positive feedbacks on sea level rise over the
next century and beyond.5 1 As Hansen avers:
In the longer term, if annual temperatures increase by
more than 3°C in the Antarctic region, which is highly
likely by the end of this century, one study projects that
globally averaged sea-levels could increase by 7 meters
over a period of 1000 years or more,52 while Hansen
estimates that sea levels could rise as much as 6 meters
within the next century.5
3
It is anticipated that climate change will have dire
implications for both natural systems and human
institutions.54 Some of the most serious impacts on natural
systems may occur in the world's oceans. In the following
section, this piece will examine the potential impacts on fish
49. See G.A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Change Projections, in IPCC,
supra note 15, at 820, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4lwgl/ar4-wgl-chapterl0.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). Rising sea
levels associated with climate change are attributable primarily to thermal
expansion of ocean waters due to warming and glacial melting. See Hansen,
supra note 16, at 16.
50. A persuasive case is made by Hansen that the IPCC in its Fourth
Assessment Report failed to adequately take into account multiple positive
feedbacks that could occur in Greenland and the West Antarctic should
temperatures rise by 2-3°C. These include "reduced surface albedo, loss of
buttressing ice shelves, dynamical response of ice streams to increased melt-
water and lower sea surface ice altitude," all of which result in massive rises in
sea level within a few centuries. See James Hansen et al., Global Temperature
Change, 103(39) PROC. NAT'L. AcAD. SCIENCES 14288, 14292 (2006).
51. See Hansen, supra note 30, at 1936; Scientific Reticence and Sea Level
Rise, 2 ENvTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 4 (2007); Michael Oppenheimer et al., The
Limits of Consensus, 317 SCI. 1505, 1505 (2007).
52. See Jonathan M. Gregory, Philippe Huybrechts & Sarah C.B. Raper,
Threatened Loss of the Greenland Ice-Sheet, 428 NATURE 616, 616 (2004); see
also Julian A. Dowdeswell, The Greenland Ice Sheet and Global Sea-Level Rise,
311 SCI. 963, 963 (2006).
53. See Hansen, supra note 15, at 22. Hansen also concluded that a 2-3°C
increase in temperatures could ultimately result in sea level rise of 25 meters
over the course of the next few hundred years. See id. at 21.
54. For an overview of impacts, see William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky,
Overview: The Exigencies That Drive Potential Causes of Action for Climate
Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: SUB-NATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND
SUPRA-NATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari Osofsky eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
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species, and more specifically, straddling and highly
migratory stocks.
B. The Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Fish Species
As Hannesson recently concluded:
The fisheries are even more dependent than agriculture
on climatic conditions. While agriculture does up to a
point compensate for the shortcomings of nature . . . , the
fisheries, which essentially are an advanced form of
hunting, are totally dependent on what nature will or will
not provide.55
Fish species are ectothermic (cold blooded); thus, water
temperature impacts growth and maturity rates, distribution
and migration patterns, and incidence of disease and is the
primary source of environmental impact on fish.56
Substantially rising oceanic temperatures throughout this
century will likely have negative impacts on highly migratory
and straddling stocks species in many regions, especially
those near the edge of their temperature tolerance range.57
For example, the range of colder water fish species, such as
capelin, polar cod and Greenland halibut, is likely to shrink,
resulting in a decline in abundance.5 8 A decline in nutrient
upwelling because of increased stratification between warmer
surface waters and colder deep water in warming oceans
could also cause a decline in bigeye and yellowfin tuna in the
central and western Pacific.59 Tuna species are a particularly
important and dependable source of revenue for Pacific small
island States.6
55. Rognvaldur Hannesson, Introduction, 31, 1, 1 (2007).
56. See William E. Schrank, The ACIA, Climate Change and Fisheries, 31
MARINE POL'Y 5, 12 (2007); G.A. Rose, On Distributional Responses of North
Atlantic Fish to Climate Change, 62 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 1360, 1360 (2005),
available at http://icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint62/7/1360.
57. See generally EUROPEAN SCI. FOUND., IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
THE EUROPEAN MARINE AND COASTAL ENVIRONMENT (2007),
http://www.vliz.be/docs/Events/JCD/MBClimateChangeVLIZO5031.pdf.
58. See id. at 12; Robin A. Clark et al., North Sea Cod and Climate Change -
Modelling the Effects of Temperature on Population Dynamics, 9 GLOBAL
CHANGE BIOLOGY 1669, 1677 (2003).
59. See WORLD BANK, CITES, SEAS AND STORMS 27 (2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPACIFICISLANDS/Resources/4-
Chapter+5.pdf.
60. See Emily E. Larocque, The Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
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Warming oceans could also radically change the
distribution of some straddling stock and highly migratory
species. For example, rising ocean temperatures could result
in a shift of the distribution of herring northward, upsetting a
delicate agreement in the Northeast between coastal States
who harvest herring within their EEZs and distant water
fishing nations (DWFNs)61 who fish on the high seas.62
Similarly, shifts in the distribution of cod and haddock in the
Barents Sea may necessitate renegotiation of existing
fisheries agreements between Russia and Norway.
63
"Strategic over fishing" of stocks that are currently recovering
from a historical decline may occur should cooperative
management agreements of this nature collapse.64 Warming
in the Pacific could similarly result in a redistribution of tuna
resources to higher latitudes, such as Japan and the western
equatorial Pacific.65
Temperature increases will also adversely affect prey
species of many straddling stocks and highly migratory
species. For example, in the North Atlantic, strong
biogeographical shifts in copepod and plankton assemblages
associated with warming trends66 could substantially reduce
the abundance of fish in the North Sea and ultimately result
in the collapse of the stocks of cod, an important straddling
stock species.67 There are already disturbing portents of this,
Ocean: Can Tuna Promote Development of Pacific Island Nations?, 4 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL'Y J. 83, 87 (2003).
61. "DWFNs are landlocked states and states that have the fleet capacity to
fish distant regions." Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How
the U.N. Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes
the Law of Fishing on the High Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 313, 316 (1996).
"Japan, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, and Poland account for almost
ninety percent of the world's high seas fish catch." Note, supra note 11, at 81.
62. See Elin H. Sissener & Trond Bjorndal, Climate Change and the
Migratory Pattern for Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring - Implications for
Management, 29 MARINE POLY 299, 305 (2005); Francis Neat & David Righton,
Warm Water Occupancy by North Sea Cod, 274 PROC. ROYAL SockY B 789, 789
(2007).
63. See EUROPEAN SCI. FOUND., supra note 57, at 23.
64. See id. at 304.
65. See WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 28.
66. See Russell B. Wynn et al., Climate-Driven Range Expansion of a
Critically Endangered Top Predator in Northeast Atlantic Waters, 3 BIOLOGY
LETTERS 529, 530-31 (2007); G. Beaugrand & P.C. Redi, Long-Term Changes in
Phytoplankton, Zooplankton and Salmon Related to Climate, 9 GLOBAL CHANGE
BIOLOGY 801-17 (2003).
67. See Gregory Beaugrand et al., Reorganization of North Atlantic Marine
[V01:48618
A VOICE FOR THE FISH?
such as warming in the North Sea over the last few decades
that has resulted in key changes in planktonic assemblages,
causing a poor food environment for cod larvae, thereby
adversely affecting recruitment success.6" The decline of
stocks has also increased their sensitivity to regional climate
warming due to shrinkages in age distribution and
geographical range.69
There will also be direct biological effects from rising
levels of carbon dioxide entering the oceans. Atmospheric
carbon dioxide increases at a rate of only approximately 50%
of human carbon dioxide emissions because of the existence of
large ocean and terrestrial sinks that absorb carbon dioxide
emissions.1° Over the past two centuries, the world's oceans
have absorbed 525 billion tons of carbon dioxide, constituting
nearly half of carbon emissions over this period.7' This, in
turn, could result in the average pH of the oceans falling by
0.5 units by 2100, which would translate into a three-fold
increase in the concentration of hydrogen ions, making the
oceans more acidic than they have been in 300 million years.72
Copepod Biodiversity and Climate, 296 SCI. 1692, 1693 (2002); see also Anthony
J. Richardson & David S. Schoeman, Climate Impact on Plankton Ecosystems in
the Northeast Atlantic, 305 SCI. 1609-12 (2004).
68. See INST. FOR ENV'T & SUSTAINABILITY, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE GENERAL JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE, MARINE AND COASTAL
DIMENSION OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN EUROPE 24 (2006),
http://ies.jrc.cec.eu.int/fileadmin/Documentation/Reports/Varie/cc-marine-repor
t-optimized2.pdf.
69. See id.
70. Richard A. Feely, Christopher L. Sabine & Victoria J. Fabry, Carbon
Dioxide and Our Ocean Legacy, NOAA, Pacific Marine Environmental
Laboratory (2006), http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/pubs/PDF/feel2899/feel2899.pdf>,
site visited on Mar. 18, 2008; Hans 0. Portner, Martina Langenbuch & Anke
Reipschlager, Biological Impact of Elevated Ocean CO2 Concentrations: Lessons
from Animal Physiology and Earth History, 60 J. OCEANOGRAPHY 705, 707
(2004).
71. See RICHARD A. FEELY, CHRISTOPHER L. SABINE & VICTORIA J. FABRY,
NOAA, PACIFIC MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY, CARBON DIOXIDE AND
OUR OCEAN LEGACY 1 (2006),
http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/pubs/PDF/feel2899/feel2899.pdf; Ulf Riebesell et al.,
Reduced Calcification of Marine Plankton in Response to Increased Atmospheric
C0 2 , 407 NATURE 364, 364 (2000). "At present, ocean chemistry is changing at
least 100 times more rapidly than it has changed during the 650,000 years
preceding our industrial era." FEELY ET AL., supra note 71, at 2.
72. See Ben I. McNeil & Richard J. Matear, Climate Change Feedbacks on
Future Oceanic Acidification, 59(B) TELLUS 191, 191 (2007). See also J.C.
Blackford & F.J. Gilbert, pH Variability and C0 2 Induced Acidification in the
North Sea, 64 J. MARINE SYSTEMS 229, 229 (2007).
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Acidification of the oceans will result in a decrease in the
concentration of carbonate and related ions that reef building
and other calcifying organisms" draw upon to produce
calcium carbonate.14  Shell and skeleton-building rates of
organisms with carbonate shells and skeletons declined by as
much as 50% in recent experiments in which dissolved carbon
dioxide was increased to double pre-Industrial Revolution
levels .
Among the species that might be severely affected are a
group of planktonic snail species with calcium carbonate
shells called pteropods. In the Ross Sea, the subpolar-polar
pteropod Limacina helicina sometimes replaces krill as the
dominant zooplankton species in the ecosystem.76 A recent
study indicates that increased acidification of pteropod
habitats in the Sea might ultimately result in the
disappearance of the species from Antarctic waters, or shift
its distribution to lower latitudes.77 The potential exclusion of
the pteropod from other polar and sub-polar regions could
have negative impacts on several straddling stock species for
which it is a prey species, including North Pacific salmon,
mackerel, herring and cod.78 Other potential impacts of
reduced pH in the oceans could include disruptions in the
carbon cycle and the nutrient ratios, which could adversely
. The dissolution of carbon dioxide in the oceans results in the production of a
weak acid, called carbonic acid. See Joan A. Kleypas et al., Geochemical
Consequences of Increased Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide on Coral Reefs, 284 SCI.
118, 118 (1999). Carbonic acid readily releases hydrogen ions, the concentration
of which determines the acidity of the water body. See THE ROYAL SOC'Y,
OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE,
POLICY DOC. 12/05, at 6 (2005),
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id= 13539.
73. An example of non-coral reef builders is rudistid bivalves, which secrete
calcium carbonate shells or skeletons. See Kaustuv Roy & John M. Pandolfi,
Responses of Marine Species and Ecosystems to Past Climate Change, in
CLIMATE CHANGE & BIODIVERSITY 164 (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah eds.,
2005).
74. See 0. HOEGH-GULDBERG ET AL., GREENPEACE, PACIFIC IN PERIL, 14
(2000), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/australia/resources/reports/climate-
change/coral-bleaching-pacific-in-pe.pdf.
75. See FEELY ETAL., supra note 71, at 2.
76. See James C. Orr et al., Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification Over the
Twenty-First Century and its Impact on Calcifying Organisms, 437 NATURE 681,
685 (2005).
77. See id.
78. See id.; FEELY ETAL., supra note 71, at 3.
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affect phytoplankton species critical for many fish species,
including straddling stocks and high migratory species.7 9
In the next section, this article will examine the
prospects for national and international institutional
responses to climate change, primarily national legislation
and treaties, to address the threats posed by climate change,
including fish species.
C. International Legal Responses to Climate Change
The primary international legal response to climate
change to date is the United Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), ° which entered into force in
1994 and has been ratified by 189 countries and the
European Economic Community (EEC)."8 Unfortunately,
resistance by several nations, most prominently the United
States and OPEC States, to mandatory reduction targets for
greenhouse gas emissions led the drafters to resort to
"constructive ambiguities" and "guidelines, rather than a
legal commitment." 2 Thus, the UNFCCC merely calls on the
Parties in Annex I (developed countries and economies in
transition) to "aim" to return their emissions back to 1990
levels. 3
By 1995, the greenhouse gas emissions of most developed
countries were already well above 1990 levels and a study by
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
projected that emissions from industrialized countries would
rise between 11- 24% over the next fifteen years.8 4 The
realization that more substantive measures were necessary
ultimately led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the
79. See INST. FOR ENV'T & SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 68, at 39.
80. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
[hereinafter UNFCCC].
81. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Secretariat, UNFCCC: Status of Ratifications,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential-background/convention/status of ratification/ap
plication/pdf/unfccc ratification_22.11.06.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
82. Ranee Khooshie Lai Panjabi, Can International Law Improve the
Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 491,
494 (1993).
83. See UNFCCC, supra note 80, art. 4(2)(b).
84. See Bas Arts, New Arrangements in Climate Policy, 52 CHANGE 1, 2
(2000).
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UNFCCC 5 at the Third Conference of the Parties in 1997.
The Protocol entered into force in 2005 and currently has 169
States and the EEC as Parties. 6
The Protocol calls for industrialized States and States
with economies in transition to reduce their aggregate
greenhouse gas emissions to at least 5% below 1990 levels in
the commitment period of 2008 to 2012.87 In addition, parties
will establish commitments for subsequent periods through
amendments to pertinent provisions of the Protocol, with
consideration of such commitments to begin at least seven
years before the end of the first commitment period. 8
Unfortunately, for several reasons, the Protocol is not the
panacea that the popular press sometimes portrays it to be.
First, President Bush announced in 2001 that the United
States, responsible for 25% of the world's anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, would not become a Party to the
Protocol. 9 As an alternative, the President proposed the
"Global Climate Initiative" (GCI) as part of his 2002 "Clear
Skies Initiative," which would seek to reduce the "greenhouse
gas intensity" of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next ten
years.90 "Greenhouse gas intensity" is defined as the ratio of
greenhouse gases to economic output.91
While touted as a bold approach by the Bush
Administration, in reality, the GCI constituted an extremely
tepid response by the world's largest producer of greenhouse
gases. While the Kyoto Protocol would have committed the
United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by
seven percent below 1990 levels,92 under the GCI it is
85. See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
86. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Secretariat, supra note 81.
87. See id. art. 3(1).
88. See id. art 3(9); art. 21(7).
89. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Bush Discusses Global Climate Change (June 11, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html.
90. See The White House, Global Climate Change Policy Book (Feb. 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html. The
proposal also called, inter alia, for increasing funding for climate change
research by $700 million in FY 2003. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 85, at Annex B.
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estimated that emissions will rise to 32% above 1990 levels. 3
The GCI ultimately withered on the vine after failing to clear
out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee
in March of 2005.94
While the Bush Administration has continued to tout a
voluntary, technologically-driven approach, the UNFCCC
Secretariat recently projected that U.S. greenhouse gas
93. See Detlef van Vuuren et al., An Evaluation of the Level of Ambition and
Implications of the Bush Climate Change Initiative, 2 CLIMATE POLY 293, 295
(2002); A.P.G. DE MOOR ET AL., DUTCH MINISTRY OF ENV'T, EVALUATING THE
BUSH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE, RIVM Report 278001019/2002, at 13 (2002).
94. See Michael Janofsky, Bush-Backed Emissions Bill Fails to Reach
Senate Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.truthout.orgcgi-
bin/artman/execview.cgi/34/9550. The United States, China, India, Japan,
South Korea and Australia, responsible for 49% of the world's greenhouse gas
emissions, did agree to form the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development
and Climate in 2005. The Partnership's primary objective is to "promote and
create an enabling environment for the development, diffusion, deployment and
transfer of existing and emerging cost-effective, cleaner technologies and
practices . . . ." Potential areas for collaboration include development of energy
efficiency programs, clean coal, renewable energy sources, including wind, solar,
and geothermal, and carbon sequestration projects. It is contemplated that a
non-binding compact will be established to specify terms of implementation of
the Partnership. Press Release, Prime Minister of Austl., Vision Statement of
Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States of
America for a New Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
(July 28, 2005),
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media-releases/mediaReleasel482.html#statemen
t; ANNA MATYSEK ET AL., ABARE RESEARCH REPORT, TECHNOLOGY - ITS ROLE IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 7, (2006),
http://www.abareconomics.com/publicationshtml/climate/climate-06/cctechnol
ogy.pdf. However, the Partnership agreement is unlikely to substantially
change the terrain as it does not incorporate legally binding commitments or
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, obviating the incentive for the
public and private sectors to deploy costly new technologies, and does not, at
this point, have a funding mechanism for the programs it outlines, including
facilitation of transfers of low-emission technologies to developing countries.
See ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, REDEFINING ASIA: VISIONS AND REALITIES, HARVARD
PROJECT FOR ASIAN AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 26 (2006),
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=920756 ; Richard Black,
Climate Pact: For Good or Bad?, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2005,
http//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4725681.stm. As Anthony Hobley, Chairman
of the London Climate Change Services concluded: "This partnership does not
provide anything additional to the UNFCCC to which all of the countries
involved have already signed up." Liz Bossley, Asia-Pacific Partnership:
Complementing or Competing with Kyoto?, XLVIII MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY,
No. 32, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v48n32-
5OD01.htm. Moreover, to date, Australia and the United States combined have
pledged to spend a paltry $455 million over the next five years on clean energy
projects See Clair Miller, New Climate Partnership Makes Little Difference, 4(2)
FRONTIERS IN ECO. & ENV'T 60, 60 (2006).
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emissions will be more than 32% above 1990 levels by 2010,
and more than 50% above 1990 levels by 2020. 9" The steady
upward projection of emissions is in no small part
attributable to the U.S.'s continued commitment to coal,
which produces triple the carbon dioxide per unit of energy as
natural gas and double that of oil.96 Fifty percent of the
electricity generated in the United States is currently
produced from coal and an estimated 130 new coal-fired
plants are on the drawing boards.97 As the IPCC recently
observed, energy infrastructure decisions over the next few
decades will exert substantial influence on future greenhouse
gas emissions given the long lifetimes of such facilities. 98
There is some hope that the United States may be
prepared to re-engage the world community. At the G8
Summit in June of 2007, the United States joined the other
States in adopting an "Agenda for Global Growth and
Stability," which included a section on addressing climate
change. In the Agenda, the G8 States acknowledged the need
for "resolute and concerted action" to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and that "tackling climate change is a shared
responsibility for all."99 However, primarily because of U.S.
resistance, the G8 stopped short of agreeing to specific targets
and timetables for reducing emissions. Rather, it only
pledged to "consider seriously" the decisions made by the
European Union (EU), Canada and Japan to reduce emissions
by at least half of 1990 levels by 2050.10 Later in 2007,
President Bush invited the EU, the United Nations and
95. See UNFCCC Secretariat, Data Appendices to UNFCCC Presentation at
the AWG Workshop, Nov. 7, 2006, at 6, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_12/in-
sessionworkshops/application/pdf/061107-6-ghg-app.pdf.
96. See William K. Stevens, Global Economy Slowly Cuts Use of High-
Carbon Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at A12. Coal-burning plants
contributed most of the new carbon dioxide emitted by the electric power sector,
which in turn has accounted for nearly half of the 18% increase in carbon
dioxide emissions in the United States between 1990 and 2004. See Megan
Tady, Climate Change Gas Emissions Way Up Nationwide, ALTERNET, Apr. 20,
2007, http://www.alternet.org/story/50624.
97. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COAL AND CLIMATE
CHANGE FACTS, http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/coalfacts.cfm
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
98. See Mitigation of Climate Change, supra note 33, at 18.
99. G8 SUMMIT 2007 HEILIGENDAMM, GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 40-41 (2007).
100. See id. $49.
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eleven industrial and developing States to work toward a
long-term goal for emissions reductions by 2008.101 However,
some environmentalists fear that the United States may be
seeking to undermine the Kyoto process, especially since the
Bush administration has continued to oppose mandatory
emissions caps.
10 2
101. See Matt Spetalnick, Bush Calls for Meeting on Global Warming for
September, PLANET ARK,
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfn/newsid/43467/story.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
102. See id. Another potential positive development in the United States is a
flurry of legislative activity in the 110th Congress to address climate change,
with more than 125 bills, resolutions and amendments introduced through July
2007 to address climate change. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change,
Legislation in the 110th Congress Related to Global Climate Change,
http://www.pewclimate.org/whats-being-done/in-the-congress/1l0thcongress.c
fm (last visited Aug. 9, 2007). Several of the bills would establish cap and trade
systems that would dramatically reduce emissions over the course of the next
few decades, but the prognosis for passage of such measures now appear "slim"
for this session. See Full of Sound and Fury, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2007,
available at
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?storyid=9475971; see also
Craig Bennett & Dan Adamson, The Bumpy Road to Federal C0 2 Caps, POWER,
July 2007, at 43. At the sub-national level, there are also a number of regional
and state initiatives to address climate change that may ultimately have a
positive impact. For example, in 2006, California, which is the twelfth largest
emitter of carbon dioxide globally, passed the California Global Warming
Solutions Act, or AB32. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov.
Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/4111/; see
also Assemb. B. 32, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asn/ab_0001-
0050/ab 32 bill 20070501_amendedasm v96.pdf [hereinafter AB321. AB32
calls for the state to reduce its greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. See
id. § 38550. The law provides for the establishment of additional targets
thereafter, with the ultimate goal of reducing the state's emissions by 80%
below 1990 levels by 2050. See Office of the Governor, supra. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the state can achieve this goal in the face of a projected
doubling of its population in the next 40 years and likely political pressure to
downgrade the commitment if there is not ultimately a commensurate federal
mandate. See Bruce Murray, Global Cooling in the Sunshine State, ANALYSIS
ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://www.analysisonline.org/site/aoarticle-display.asp?issueid=2&secid= 140
002434&news id=140001412. In the east, ten states have now joined the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which sets a cap on power plant
emissions at approximately current levels of 120 million tons of carbon dioxide
between 2009 and 2015, and then 10% below this level by 2019. See Reg'l
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou4faqs-12-20-05.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
Even assuming the states achieve this goal, this is an extremely modest
commitment compared to what ultimately must be done, but at least RGGI
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Second, in developing the rules for implementing the
Protocol, many concessions were made to wavering nations
that substantially diluted the Parties' commitments. Thus,
some analysts believe that implementation of the Protocol
will ultimately result in substantially less reductions in
emissions than originally contemplated, or even a net
increase over 1990 levels.0 3
Third, it is far from clear that most of the industrialized
State Parties to Kyoto will fulfill their obligations in the first
commitment period. For example, Japan's emissions are
currently more than 14% above its Kyoto targets. 4 Canada's
emissions are now more than 30% above 1990 levels,105 and
the government recently acknowledged that it will not meet
its commitments, but will seek to achieve less ambitious
establishes an institutional framework in the region that hopefully will both
commit to further reductions in the future and help to pressure the federal
government to establish national mandates. Moreover, a large number of states
are taking actions to reduce greenhouse gas initiatives, including through
renewable portfolio standards, greenhouse gas emissions targets, and tax
incentives to reduce emissions. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 101: STATE ACTION,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101-States.pdf (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
103. See Tom Athanasiou & Paul Baer, Bonn and Genoa: A Tale of Two Cities
and Two Movements, Foreign Policy in Focus, Discussion Paper, Aug. 2001, at 3
(discussing that concessions made in negotiations to flesh out Kyoto Protocol
could "render the protocol's nominal mandate of a 5.2% overall reduction in
rich-world emissions (from their 1990 baseline) into a 0.3% increase); Miranda
A. Schreurs, Competing Agendas and the Climate Change Negotiations: The
United States, the European Union, and Japan, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11218, 11218
(2001).
104. See Ikuko Kao & Neil Chatterjee, Japan's Kyoto Gap Widens as
Emissions Rise, PLANET ARK, Oct. 18, 2006,
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/38538/story.htm; see also
Japan Emissions to Rise, Kyoto Target at Risk - Paper, PLANET ARK, Aug. 9,
2007, http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/43564/story.htm
(stating that Japan's greenhouse gas emissions will rise by 0.9% in the fiscal
year ending in March 2011).
105. See Rob Gillies, Canada Won't Meet Kyoto Emissions Targets,
BOSTON.COM, Apr. 26, 2007,
http'//www.boston.com/news/world/canada/articles/2007/0426/canadawontme
et.kyoto -emission-targets/. The government's own new "Turning the Corner"
climate change strategy would put Canada 39% above its Kyoto target in 2012.
See Envtl. News Serv., Canada Sued for Abandoning Kyoto Climate
Commitment, ECOJUSTICE, May 29, 2007, available at
http://www.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/press-clips/canada-sued-for-abandoning-
kyoto-climate-
commitment/9searchterm=Canada%20Sued%20for%20Abandoning%20Kyoto%2
OClimate%20Commitment.
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targets. °6 Even the EU, the staunchest supporter of the
Protocol, is struggling to meet its commitments. Greenhouse
gas emissions in the EU rose in 2004 and 2005,107 and seven
of the EU-15 States are projected to exceed their individual
emission limits set by the EU.10 8 The European Commission
projects that the bloc's Kyoto commitment will be met
through the implementation of additional initiatives, but has
emphasized that there is little room for error at this point."0 9
Finally, even if the Kyoto Protocol, as originally drafted,
was faithfully implemented by all industrialized nations, it
would constitute only an extremely modest down payment on
what ultimately must be done to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse emissions. This is true for two
primary reasons. First, as indicated above, the Kyoto
Protocol calls for Annex I Parties to reduce their overall
greenhouse gas emissions by 5% in the first commitment
period."0  By contrast, stabilization of atmospheric
greenhouse gases at levels that produce no more than a 2-3°C
increase in temperatures from pre-Industrial Revolution
levels, which many climate experts cite as a critical "climate
tipping point that could lead to intolerable impacts on human
well-being,""' will require the world community to reduce
106. See Gillies, supra note 105. Under the latest plan promulgated by the
conservative Canadian government, Canada will not meet its commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol until 2025, rather than 2012. See Environmentalists
Pan Harper's Pitch on Climate, CTV.CA, June 4, 2007,
http://www.ctv.ca/servletArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070603/harperg8070
604/20070604?hub=Canada.
107. See Helena Spongenberg, EU Falls Behind on Green Targets,
EUOBSERVER.COM, June 23, 2006, available at
http://euobserver.com/9/21944Prk=1.
108. See Press Release, Europa, Climate Change: Member States Need to
Intensify Efforts to Reach Kyoto Emission Targets (Oct. 27, 2006),
http://europa.eulrapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1488&format=H
TML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
109. See id.
110. See UNFCCC SECRETARIAT, supra note 87.
111. Bierbaum et al., supra note 29, at xi; see also PAUL BAER & TOM
ATHANASIOU, HONESTY ABOUT DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, ECOEQUITY,
http://www.ecoequity.orgceo/ceo 8_2.htm#dangerous (last visited Feb. 16,
2008); B.C. O'Neill & M. Oppenheimer, Climate Change - Dangerous Climate
Impacts and the Kyoto Protocol, 296 SCI. 1971-72 (2002). However, it needs to
be emphasized that even lower temperature increases will have serious
implications. For example, a 1'C increase in atmospheric temperatures will
seriously imperil the world's coral reef ecosystems, as well as many other
ecosystems in developing countries. See id. at 1971; HADLEY CTR., AVOIDING
DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE
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greenhouse gas emissions by 60-70%.112 Moreover,
industrialized countries might have to reduce their emissions
by as much as 80% by the middle of the century if developing
nations are to be permitted some growth in their emissions
levels.113
Second, the Protocol currently does not impose emissions
reduction commitments on developing countries, even though
it is projected that the developing world's share of global
emissions will be approximately 55% by 2025.114 Indeed, the
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency recently
concluded that China, with fossil fuel consumption in recent
years rising at a blistering pace of more than 9% annually,1
1 5
STABILISATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONCENTRATIONS 14 (2005),
http://www.stabilisation2005.com/Steering-Commitee-Report.pdf.
112. See JOSEPH E. ALDY ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
Q&A: KYOTO PROTOCOL 23 (2001),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Long%2DTerm%2OTarget%2Epdf
(stating that stabilization of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels at 550 parts per
million, yielding an estimated 1.6-2.9*C increase in temperatures from pre-
industrial levels, necessitates 60% reduction in emissions); Jonathan Pershing
& Fernando Tudela, A Long-Term Target: Framing the Climate Effort, in
BEYOND KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE
CHANGE (Joseph E. Aldy et al. eds., 2004), A recent study by Hare and
Meinshausen suggests that the cutbacks may have to be even more dramatic.
The study concludes that there is a 66% risk of overshooting a 2°C increase of
temperatures from pre-industrial levels even if atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide are held to 450 parts per million. See Bill Hare & Malte
Meinshausen, How Much Warming Are We Committed to and How Much Can be
Avoided?, 75 CLIMATIC CHANGE 111, 129 (2006). The authors conclude that
"[o]nly scenarios that aim at stabilization levels at or below 400 ppm CO 2
equivalence (- 350ppm CO2) can limit the probability of exceeding 2°C to
reasonable levels . . . ." Id. at 137. Even stabilization at 650ppm CO2
equivalence would require reductions of approximately 50% by 2100. See Detlef
P. van Vuuren et al., Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas Concentrations at Low Levels:
An Assessment of Reduction Strategies and Costs, 81 CLIMATIC CHANGE 119,
120 (2007).
113. See David D. Doniger, Antonia V. Herzog & Daniel A. Lashof, An
Ambitious, Centrist Approach to Global Warming Legislation, 314 SCI. 764, 764
(2006); ECOFYS GMBH ET AL., WWF CLIMATE SCORECARDS: COMPARISON OF THE
CLIMATE PERFORMANCE OF THE G8 COUNTRIES 4 (2005), available at
http://www.panda.org/downloads/climate-change/g8scorecardsjun291ight.pdf.
114. See KEVIN BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE DATA: INSIGHTS AND OBSERVATION, 16 (2004).
Overall, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol only generate approximately one third
of the world's greenhouse emissions. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 28, at 36.
115. See Robert Collier, China About to Pass U.S. as World's Top Generator of
Greenhouse Gases, SFGATE.COM, Mar. 5, 2007, http://sfgate.com/cgi-
binlarticle.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/3/O5/MNG18OFHF2 1.DTL&type=printable.
China's carbon dioxide emissions over the period of 2001-2006 were almost
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surpassed the United States in 2006 in aggregate carbon
dioxide emissions. 116
Given the modest commitments undertaken under Kyoto,
and the likely continued rapid growth of emissions in the
United States and large developing States, it is not surprising
that the U.S. Energy Information Agency recently projected
that worldwide emissions under Kyoto would be 43,000
million metric tons in 2030, only slightly below the business
as usual projection of 43,676 million metric tons.117 Overall,
climate researchers have estimated that full implementation
of Kyoto would reduce projected warming in 2050 by only
about one twentieth of one degree and projected sea level rise
by a mere five millimeters. n8
The glacial pace of progress under the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol has led to growing despair by many actors,
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), state and
local governments in the United States, and in many nations,
especially Southern States that are particularly vulnerable to
the threat of climate change. Indeed, the trepidation of such
stakeholders has been exacerbated in the past few years by
the failure of the United States to signal its willingness to re-
engage in the Kyoto process," 9 as well as tepid support for
future commitments by other major greenhouse gas emitting
States, including China, Russia and India. 20 While the
350% higher than the emissions of the United States, Canada, the European
Union, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand combined. See id.
116. See Press Release, Netherlands Envtl. Assessment Agency, Chinese C02
in Perspective (June 22 2007),
http://www.mnp.nl/en/service/pressreleases/2007/20070622ChineseCO2emission
sinperspective.html.
117. See Michael Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 13 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
118. See Martin Parry et al., Buenos Aires and Kyoto Targets Do Little to
Reduce Climate Change Impacts, 8(4) GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 285, 285 (1998);
see also Mustafa H. Babiker, The Evolution of a Climate Regime: Kyoto to
Marrakech and Beyond, 5 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 195, 202 (2002).
119. For example, at the most recent meeting of the Group of 8 industrialized
nations, the United States refused to endorse carbon trading, one of the center
pieces of the Kyoto Protocol, as a means to reduce emissions. See also U.S.
Blocks Consensus of G8-plus-Five on Global Warming Issues, GREENWIRE, Mar.
19, 2007, available at LEXIS-NEXIS, News.
120. See Alister Doyle, UN Climate Talks Stagnate Despite Public Worries,
REUTERS ALERTNET, Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L02239660.htm. Russia and India
are, respectively, the third and fourth largest producers of greenhouse gas
emissions globally, after China and the United States. See Nita Bhalla, India
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UNFCCC Secretariat lauded the purported "Spirit of Nairobi"
at the latest (twelfth) Conference of the Parties (COP) held in
Kenya,' in reality, the Parties have made very little
progress in developing a framework for long-term reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions.122 Particularly disconcerting
was the successful opposition by the G77 countries and China
to the European Union's efforts to insert language in
negotiating documents that would have committed the
Parties to try to keep temperature increases below 2°C. 123
Furthermore, the G77/China bloc expressed the view that
developing countries should not be required to assume
binding obligations to reduce emissions, given their need for
rapid economic growth and development.124 Rather, the focus
at COP12 was on adapting to climate change impacts that
increasingly seem inevitable.1
25
Says its Carbon Emissions not Harming the World, ENV'TL. NEWS NETWORK,
Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.enn.com/top-stories/article/5645. The European
Union in February of 2007 did agree to reduce emissions to 20% below 1990
levels by 2020 and will push for a 30% commitment by industrialized States by
that date. See Press Release, Europa, Climate Change and the EU's Response,
(Feb. 15, 2007),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/58&format
=HTML&aged=O)#uage=EN&guiLanguage=enIan; Ian Traynor & David Gow,
EU Promises 20% Reduction in Carbon Emissions by 2020, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Feb. 21, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/feb/21/climatechange.climatechan
geenvironment.
121. See Press Release, UNFCCC Secretariat, "Spirit of Nairobi" Prevails as
United Nations Climate Change Conference Successfully Concludes with
Decisions to Support Developing Countries (Nov. 17, 2006),
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/press-releases-and-advisories/applicatio
n/pdf/20061117_cop_12_closing-english.pdf.
122. See Wolfgang Sterk et al., The Nairobi Climate Change Summit
(COP12-MOP2): Taking a Deep Breath before Negotiating Post-2012 Targets, 2
J. EUR. ENvTL. & PLANNING L. 139, 141 (2007). At COP12, the Parties only
agreed to a work program to analyze mitigation potentials, possible means to
achieve mitigation objectives, and consideration of further commitments by
Annex I Parties only. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Chukwumerije Okereke et al., Assessment of Key Negotiating Issues
at Nairobi Climate COP/MOP and What it Means for the Future of the Climate
Regime, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (Working Paper No. 106,
2006), at 18, at
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/TyndallWorkingPaper2007.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008). More hopefully, the most recent Chinese Five Year
Plan includes a commitment to reduce energy intensity by 20% by 2010. See id.
at 19.
125. See UNFCCC, Further Commitments for Annex I Parties and
Programme of Work (Ad Hoc Working Group, 2006),
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D. UNFSA and Climate Change
1. Overview of UNFSA
The Third United Nations Conference of the Law of Sea
convened in 1973 and culminated nine years later in the
adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). 126 UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and
currently has 148 parties. 27 A major component of UNCLOS
is provisions for the regulation of fisheries, with an emphasis
on the sovereign rights of coastal States to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage living natural resources, including fish
stocks, within their respective 200-mile EEZs.128  UNCLOS
thus extends coastal state jurisdiction over 90% of the world's
fish resources, and almost 40% of the world's oceans. 129 The
emphasis on coastal state management of fisheries resources
was premised on the belief that "entry into fisheries would be
controlled, thereby reducing both the potential for overfishing
and for overcapitalization of fishing fleets." 3 ° Moreover, it
was hoped that coastal States' authority to enforce
regulations against all fishing vessels within their respective
EEZs would obviate the problems associated with weak flag
state enforcement' 3' of national and international fisheries
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-12/application/pdf/awg conclusions.pdf;
UNFCCC, Summary of the First In-Session Workshop of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
(Ad Hoc Working Group, 2006),
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-12/application/pdf/awg2-in-sess-report-an.
pdf.
126. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclos-e.pdf.
127. See United Nations, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists
of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the
Related Agreements as at [sic] 01 February 2005, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological-lists of ratifications.h
tm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20t
he%20Sea.
128. See UNCLOS, supra note 126, arts. 58, 61-68.
129. See Derrick M. Kedziora, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Northwest Atlantic:
The 1995 Canada-EU Fishing Dispute and the United Nations Agreement on
Straddling and High Migratory Stocks, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1132, 1139
(1996-1997).
130. Donna R. Christie, The Conservation and Management of Stocks Located
Solely within the Exclusive Economic Zone, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW 396 (Ellen Hey ed., 1999).
131. Under UNCLOS, States are required to exercise "jurisdiction and
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regulations.132
While many have characterized UNCLOS as "a
constitution for the oceans,"133 it provides only general
governing principles for the management of straddling stocks
and high migratory species. In cases where stocks are found
within the EEZs of two or more coastal States, or an EEZ and
an area beyond it, UNCLOS merely requires that the
pertinent fishing States "seek" to agree upon management
measures either directly or through sub-regional or regional
organizations."' In the case of highly migratory species,
coastal States and other States with nationals fishing in the
region are exhorted to cooperate directly or through
international organizations "with a view" to ensuring
conservation and optimal utilization. 135 A proposal by some
coastal States for an arbitration clause was beaten back by
DWFNs and subsequently withdrawn. 136 Thus, States may,
consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS and in good faith,
fail to agree to conservation measures to protect highly
migratory and straddling fish stocks. 131
The lack of binding obligations in UNCLOS for high
migratory species and straddling stocks was largely
attributable to fishing in these regions not being considered a
control in administrative, technical and social matters" over ships flying their
flags. See UNCLOS, supra note 126, art. 94(1).
132. See Donna R. Christie, It Don't Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of
Coastal States Fisheries Management, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 1, 2 (2004);
Christopher C. Joyner, Compliance and Enforcement in New International
Fisheries Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271, 277-78 (1998).
133. United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, A
Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks of Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore,
President of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (1982),
available at
http'//www.un.org(Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/koh-english.pdf;
Report of the Work of the United Nations Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working
Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, A/61/65
(2006), at 21/,
http'l/daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N6/277/50/PDF/N0627750.pdfOpe
nElement.
134. See UNCLOS, supra note 126, art. 63.
135. See id. art. 64.
136. See D.H. Anderson, The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995: An Initial
Assessment, 45(2) INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 463, 465 (1996).
137. See Jon C. Goltz, The Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole: How the United
Nations Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks Might Preserve the Pollack
Fishery, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 443, 458 (1995); Mack, supra note 61, at 322-
23.
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major issue in the early 1980s.135 However, large distant
water fishing fleets were increasingly displaced from their
traditional fishing grounds as coastal States began to claim
their rights within their EEZs. This placed rapidly increasing
pressures on high migratory species and straddling stocks. 139
Moreover, technological breakthroughs during this period,
including satellite tracking, specially designed nets to
compensate for the reduced density of stocks on the high seas,
and larger and more efficient vessels, facilitated an ever-
expanding scope of fishing operations by DWFNs. 140 Overall,
the proportion of catches taken beyond 200-mile EEZs
doubled during the 1990s.'
These trends quickly took their toll. In 1994, the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that
straddling fish stock catches in EEZs and high seas had been
declining since 1989, and that many highly migratory fish
stocks, including a majority of tuna species, were depleted, in
some cases, severely.1 42
In 1992, the participants at the U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development called for an
intergovernmental conference under the auspices of the
United Nations to address effective implementation of
UNCLOS provisions related to straddling stocks and highly
138. See FAO, supra note 8, at 1; Anderson, supra note 136, at 465.
139. See Stuart Kaye, Implementing High Seas Biodiversity Conservation:
Global Geopolitical Considerations, 28 MARINE POLY 221, 222 (2004); United
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Statement of the Chairman of the Conference at the Opening of the
Organizational Session, Apr. 19, 1993, at 1, UN. Doc. A/Conf.164/7. Distant
water fishing fleets were often subsidized by high seas fishing nations. See
Alison Rieser, International Fisheries Law, Overfishing and Marine
Biodiversity, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 263 (1997).
140. See A. Anna Zumwalt, Straddling Fish Stock Spawn Fish War on the
High Seas, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLy 35, 43 (1997); Rieser, supra note
139, at 263.
141. See Note, Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Species, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 357, 365 (1999).
142. See Giselle Vigneron, Compliance and International Environmental
Agreements: A Case Study of the 1995 United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks
Agreement, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 581, 586 (1998). The status of these
stocks remains imperiled a decade later. According to the most recent analysis
by the FAO, "about 30 percent of the stocks of highly migratory tuna and tuna-
like species, more than 50 percent of the highly migratory oceanic sharks and
nearly two-thirds of the straddling stocks and the stocks of other high seas
fishery resources are overexploited or depleted." FAO, supra note 8, at iv.
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migratory species. 143 In December of 1992, the U.N. General
Assembly, recalling Agenda 21, passed Resolution 47/192,
which authorized the convening of the United Nations
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (UNCSFS).144
In 1993, the U.N. General Assembly convened the
UNCSFS, culminating in the adoption of UNFSA in August of
1995. UNFSA entered into force in December of 2001 and
currently has sixty-eight Parties,'145 "including most States
with significant interests in international fisheries." 46
The Agreement's overarching objective is to "ensure long-
term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks . ".'. The
Agreement's primary means of effectuating this objective is
through engendering cooperation between coastal States and
States fishing on the high seas by, inter alia:
" Seeking agreement between coastal States and
States on the high seas on necessary measures for
conservation of stocks in the high seas areas and
straddling stocks through direct agreements and
cooperation in Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations; 148
* Collecting and exchanging of critical data with
respect to straddling stocks and high migratory
species; 149 and
" Expanding the duties of Flag States to ensure
enforcement of and compliance with the
Convention's provisions, as well as the rights of
other States, including port States, to ensure
143. See United Nations Environment Programme , Agenda 21, Programme
of Action for Sustainable Development, ch. 17, 17.49(a)(b) (1992),
http://www.unep.org(Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=52&Art
icleID=65&l=en (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
144. See United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, G.A. Res. 47/192, at 145, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 93d
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Dec. 22, 1992).
145. See United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea, Status of the
Agreement,
http://www.un.orgfDepts/los/convention-agreements/conventionoverviewfish_
stocks.htm%20stocks (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
146. Balton & Koehler, supra note 12, at 7.
147. UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 2.
148. See id. arts. 7-10.
149. See id. art. 14.
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compliance with the Agreement.1'"
However, while the focus of UNFSA is on the relationship
between coastal States and States fishing in areas beyond
EEZs, there are a large number of provisions that could give
rise to claims associated with climate change impacts on
straddling stocks and highly migratory species.
2. UNFSA and Climate Change
UNFSA adopts the well-recognized "no harm rule" of
international environmental law, which obliges States to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not result in injuries to the interests of other States or areas
beyond national control.15' UNFSA provides that "States
Parties are liable in accordance with international law for
damage or loss attributable to them in regard to this
Agreement."5 2 Many of the provisions of UNFSA, in turn,
could provide the basis for a Party to bring an action against
one or more other Parties for climate-related damages to
fisheries.
As indicated above, the Agreement's primary objective is
to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.5 3 The
Agreement mandates that its Parties take conservation and
management measures to further this objective. While the
Agreement's primary focus is on the impacts of harvesting
fish stocks,54 it clearly contemplates the regulation of other
potential activities that could imperil the conservation and
150. See id. arts. 19-23.
151. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. (Dec. 1974); 2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
601(1987); see also RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2005); Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, State
Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages - A Legal and
Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL'Y 1109, 1110 (2004). As embodied in
documents such as Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration, treaties, including the UNFCCC, and the Trail Smelter
Arbitration in the 1941, the no harm rule "has its foundations in the principle of
good neighbourliness between States formally equal under international law."
See id.
152. UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 35.
153. See UNFSA, supra note 147.
154. See Timothy D. Smith, United States Practice and the Bering Sea: Is it
Consistent with a Norm of Ecosystem Management?, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
141, 150 (1995).
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sustainable use of such stocks. For example, UNFSA
requires the Parties to assess the impact of "other human
activities and environmental factors on target stocks and
species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or
dependent upon the target stocks.'
55
Moreover, the Agreement requires the Parties to
"minimize pollution."156 While the Agreement does not define
the term "pollution," Article 4 provides that UNFSA is to be
"interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner
consistent with the Convention."1 57  Thus, it is germane to
look at the definition of pollution provided for in UNCLOS.
In pertinent part, UNCLOS defines "pollution of the marine
environment" as:
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances or energy into the marine environment ...
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life ...
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing ...158
Rising ocean temperatures related to climate change
could not reasonably be construed as a "substance" under
Article 1.1 of UNCLOS. However, the rising ocean
temperatures would likely be construed by a dispute
resolution body as "energy" because the introduction of heat,
such as waste water from production processes, appears to
fall under this rubric.'59 Moreover, as developed above, the
uptake of anthropogenically-generated carbon dioxide into the
oceans can result in direct deleterious impacts on marine
life, 6° which clearly brings carbon dioxide under the
definition in Article 1.1 of UNCLOS of a polluting "substance"
introduced into the ocean.
Where necessary, UNFSA also imposes obligations on the
Parties to adopt conservation and management measures for
"species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with
or dependent upon target species . . ." and to "protect
biodiversity of the marine environment." 61 Moreover, the
155. UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 5(d).
156. Id. art. 5(f).
157. Id. art. 4.
158. UNCLOS, supra note 126, art. 1(4).
159. See Verheyen, supra note 151, at 194-95.
160. See infra sec. 2.
161. UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 5(g).
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Parties are obligated to ensure adequate implementation and
enforcement of such measures "through effective monitoring,
control and surveillance."'62  Finally, UNFSA requires the
Parties to promote and conduct relevant scientific research. 163
In the context of climate change, a coherent research agenda
is extremely important to ensure quantification of potential
impacts on specific species and to incorporate such impacts
into stock assessment processes that are critical for successful
long-term management of marine species. 164
Thus, to the extent that climate change may result in the
diminution of certain stocks, or alter their distribution in a
way that adversely affects the interests of discrete Parties, a
cause of action could arise under the Agreement by which
Parties might seek: 1) damages; 2) enforcement of
conservation obligations; and 3) a commitment by all Parties
to assess the potential impacts of climate change on species
regulated under UNFSA..
Rare among international environmental agreements,
UNFSA provides for a binding dispute resolution mechanism
when efforts to resolve the dispute through non-binding
methods, e.g. negotiation, inquiry, mediation or conciliation,
have been unavailing. Part VIII of the Agreement applies the
dispute resolution mechanism set out in Part XV of UNCLOS
to any dispute under the Agreement, even where one or more
of the disputants are not Parties to UNCLOS. 16
As Hafetz observed, UNCLOS "creates a binding system
of obligations and dispute resolutions, which confers on a
forum international jurisdiction, authority, and implementing
powers that exceed those of other international
environmental law forums and rival those conferred on the
World Trade Organization .... ,,161 Part XV of UNCLOS
provides States with four potential fora for settlement of
162. Id. art. 5(1).
163. See Id. art. 14(3).
164. See Jonathan A. Hare & Kenneth W. Able, Mechanistic Links Between
Climate and Fisheries Along the East Coast of the United States: Explaining
Population Outbursts of Atlantic Croaker (Micropogonias undulates), 16(1)
FISHERIES OCEANOGRAPHY 31, 45 (2007).
165. See id. art. 30(1).
166. Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environmental
and Economic Development: Article 131(3) of the Third Law of the Sea
Convention, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 583, 596 (2000).
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disputes: 167 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS):168 the International Court of Justice; an arbitral
panel; or a special arbitral panel. 69 States may choose to
declare their choice of forum, but in cases where they have
not, or Parties to a dispute have not accepted the same
procedure for dispute settlement, the dispute must be
submitted to binding arbitration unless the Parties agree
otherwise. 17' To date, the vast majority of Parties to
UNCLOS have, de facto, chosen arbitration by their silence
on the matter, as have most Parties to UNFSA.
171
E. Potential Barriers to Causes of Action under UNFSA
A Party to UNFSA pursuing an action based on climate
change damages would face some imposing barriers, though
none need prove fatal:
1. Causation
As Smith and Shearman observe, "establishing legal
causation in climate change actions-that is, proving that a
defendant's actions caused the harm suffered by a plaintiff-
will pose the greatest obstacle for a majority of plaintiffs."72
Indeed, causation issues have been raised in two
167. Under UNCLOS's dispute resolution mechanism "[a]ny decision
rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be
final and shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute." UNCLOS,
supra note 126, art. 296(1).
168. See id. at Annex VI. The Tribunal is composed of twenty-one judges
representing the legal systems of UNCLOS's Parties. See id. at Annex VI, arts.
1,2,4.
169. See id. art. 287(1). Special arbitral panels may be convened for disputes
involving "(1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the marine
environment, (3) marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including
pollution from vessels and by dumping..." Id. at Annex VIII, art. 1.
170. See id. art. 287(3)-(5).
171. See ANDREE KIRCHNER, INTERNATIONAL MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
22 (2003); United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Straddling Stocks Convention, Declarations, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/fish-stocks-agreementdec
larations.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). The United States has chosen a
special arbitral tribunal for, inter alia, disputes involving fisheries or marine
pollution. See id. However, since most Parties to UNFSA have chosen either
another option for dispute resolution, or none at all, any dispute involving the
United States would likely be settled by an arbitration panel as that is the
default when the Parties cannot agree on the same option.
172. JOSEPH SMITH & DAVID SHEARMAN, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 107
(2006).
20081 A VOICE FOR THE FISH? 639
international climate cases to date: the Inuit petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,'73 and the
petitions to the World Heritage Committee to list several
sites allegedly threatened by climate change on the List of
World Heritage in Danger under the World Heritage
Convention.'7 4 Domestic legal systems, and to some extent
international law, draw a distinction between general and
specific causation. The former refers to the causal link
"between an activity and the general outcome," and the latter
to the causal link between a specific activity and specific
damage. 7 5 It is likely that both aspects of causation would be
raised in an UNFSA climate action.
2. General Causation
In many cases, declining fish stocks or shifts in
distribution may be attributable to a number of factors other
than, or in conjunction with, climate change, including
overfishing,'76 habitat destruction,'77 or diminution of prey
173. In the course of the hearing granted by the Commission in March of
2007, Commissioners Abramovitch and Pinheiro pressed the petitioners as to
whether the Commission could attribute State responsibility to the United
States for the alleged human rights violations to petitioners given that many
other States, including States that were not members of the Organization of the
American States, were substantial emitters of greenhouse gases. See Response
to the Commission's Question on Attribution of Responsibility Submitted by
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Earthjustice and the Center for International
Environmental Law, Mar. 2007.
174. See United States, Position of the United State [sic] of America on
Climate Change with Respect to the World Heritage Convention and World
Heritage Sites, available at
http://www.elaw.org/assets/word/u.s.climate.US%20position%20paper.doc (last
visited Sept. 28, 2007). The United States contended, inter alia, that "there is
not enough data available to distinguish whether climatic changes at the named
World Heritage Sites are the result of human-induced climate change or natural
variability." Id. at 4. For additional information on the petitions, see Erica J.
Thorson, The World Heritage Convention & Climate Change: The Case for a
Climate-Change Mitigation Strategy beyond the Kyoto Protocol, in BURNS &
OSOFSKY, supra note 54.
175. See Richard S.J. Tol & Roda Verheyen, Liability and Compensation for
Climate Change Damages - A Legal and Economic Assessment, Research Unit
Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, FNU-9 (2001),
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-
papersliability.pdflast visited on Mar. 23, 2008.
176. See Samuel F. Herrick, Jr. et al., Management Application of an
Empirical Model of Sardine-Climate Regime Shifts, 31 MARINE POL'Y 71, 91
(2007); Gian-Reto Walther et al., Ecological Responses to Recent Climate
Change, 416 NATURE 389, 393 (2002).
177. See K.I. Matics, Measures for Enhancing Marine Fisheries Stock in
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species. 17 As a report to the European Commission recently
concluded, "it is extremely difficult to separate, in terms of
changes in population densities and recruitment, regional
climate effects from direct anthropogenic influences."179 Thus,
a Party to UNFSA defending itself against a claim of
damages associated with climate change may contend that
it's not possible to link species decline or distribution shifts
solely to climatic factors, and thus it cannot be held liable
under UNFSA. This argument should not prevail. First,
even if other factors may constitute threats to regulated
species, clearly, climate change is a substantial peril for many
of these species. A tribunal or panel could assess the extent
of this threat by employing statistical probability analysis to
support a finding of liability where a moving party can
establish that climate change results in a "material increase
in risk."i8 0 This approach has been embraced by a number of
courts in recent years.""' This would in turn trigger the
obligation of major emitters of greenhouse gases that are
Southeast Asia, 34(3) OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 233-47 (1997).
178. See Michel Potier et al., Forage Fauna in the Diet of Three Large Pelagic
Fishes (lancetfish, swordfish and yellowfin tuna) in the Western Equatorial
Indian Ocean, 83(l) FISHERIES RES. 60-72 (2007); Giovanni Bearzi et al., Prey
Depletion Caused by Overfishing and the Decline of Marine Megafauna in
Eastern Ionian Sea Coastal Waters (central Mediterranean), 127 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 373-82 (2006).
179. INST. FOR ENV'T & SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 68, at 21,
http://ies.jrc.cec.eu.intfileadmin/Documentation/ReportsNarie/cc-marine-repor
tLoptimized2.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008); see also Anna Rindorf & Peter
Lewy, Warm, Windy Winters Drive Cod North and Homing of Spawners Keeps
Them There, 43 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 445, 445 (2006).
180. See Peter A. Stott, D.A. Stone, & M.R. Allen, Human Contribution to the
European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004). "It is an ill-posed
question whether the 2003 heatwave was caused, in a simple deterministic
sense, by a modification of the external influences on climate-for example,
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere-because
almost any such weather event might have occurred by chance in an unmodified
climate. However, it is possible to estimate by how much human activities may
have increased the risk of the occurrence of such a heatwave." Id. Pefialver
argues that the "but for" analysis employed by many courts to assess causation,
reflecting a "deductive nomological" model of scientific explanation, is
inappropriate in causal analysis in toxic tort and climate change cases. He
advocates a probabilistic theory of causation that reflects the nature of these
phenomena. See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying
Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563,
582-85 (1998).
181. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven, [2002] UKHL 22 (appeals taken from Austl.,
Can. and Britain), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2002/22.html.
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Parties to UNFSA to adopt measures to reduce these
emissions to levels that substantially reduce the threat to
high migratory and straddling stock species.182
Second, all causation challenges must be considered in
light of the regime's precautionary principle provisions.
Recognition of the failure of the assimilative capacity
paradigm to adequately safeguard the environment led to the
formulation of the precautionary principle:
The precautionary concept advocates a shift away from
the primacy of scientific proof and traditional economic
analyses that do not account for environmental
degradation. Instead, emphasis is placed on: 1) the
vulnerability of the environment; 2) the limitations of
science to accurately predict threats to the environment,
and the measures required to prevent such threats; 3) the
availability of alternatives (both methods of production
and products) which permit the termination or
minimization of inputs into the environment; and 4) the
need for long-term, holistic economic considerations,
accounting for, among other things, environmental
degradation and the costs of waste treatment.1 83
"The precautionary principle can also be viewed as a
safeguard against the opportunism of decision-makers in
situations of asymmetric information or imperfect monitoring
by society." 8 4  In the context of management and
conservation of wildlife species, the principle reflects the
recognition that "scientific understanding of ecosystems is
complicated by a host of factors, including complex and
cascading effects of human activities and uncertainty
introduced by naturally chaotic population dynamics."185
UNFSA provides that "States shall apply the
precautionary approach widely to conservation, management
and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly
182. See UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 5(a).
183. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy And
Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 307 (1992).
184. YLVA ARVIDSSON, IIIEE REPORTS THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE:
EXPERIENCES FROM IMPLEMENTATION INTO SWEDISH LAW, 11 (2001), available
at http://www.iiiee.lu.se/informationlibrary/publications/reports/20O1/Ylva-
Arvidsson.pdf.
185. Robert J. Wilder, Precautionary Principle; Prevention Rather Than Cure,
OCEAN 98.
http'J/www.wildershares.com/pdf/Ocean98.Nature%20article.Wilder.pdf (last
visited Feb.1 16, 2008).
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migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine
resources and preserve the marine environment." 1 6 Thus,
even under scenarios of uncertainty about a given threat,
such as climate change impacts, Article 6 of UNFSA provides
"[t]he absence of adequate scientific information shall not be
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation
and management measures.""7 As Colburn observes, "[t]he
precautionary approach essentially reverses the process of
marine scientific research (MSR) application in the
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks,
allowing states and RFOs to proceed with conservation
measures even in the absence of scientific certainty."8 8 Thus,
in the context of potential threats posed by climate change to
fish species regulated under UNFSA, it can be argued that
the Parties have an obligation to take action even in the
absence of definitive proof of causation.
3. Specific Causation
The targeted Party in a climate-related UNFSA action
might argue that climate change is caused by a multitude of
anthropogenic sources, and thus, any specific harm cannot be
attributable to a specific Party, even a large greenhouse
emitting State such as the United States or China. The issue
of specific causation would be most germane in cases where a
moving Party seeks damages.' 9 A Party to UNFSA might not
seek monetary damages in pressing a climate change case
against another Party. Rather a Party bringing such an
action might be exclusively, or in the alternative, seeking a
commitment by the targeted Party to fulfill its "duty to
cooperate" under the treaty9 ° by enacting effective measures
to contribute to the goal of "long-term sustainability of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks .. .
"191
Under the terms of UNFSA, as well as customary
international law, all treaty obligations must be fulfilled in
186. Id. art. 6(1).
187. Id. art. 6(2).
188. Colburn, supra note 8, at 347.
189. See Verheyen, supra note 1591, at 248.
190. See UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 5.
190. See id. art. 6(1).
191. Id. art. 5(a).
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good faith, the principle of pacta sunt servanda.92 The
obligation of good faith, which Henkin has correctly
characterized as "the most important principle of
international law,"193 imposes a duty upon treaty Parties to
exercise their sovereign rights in a manner that is consistent
with their treaty obligations.194 Moreover, the failure to fulfill
treaty obligations in good faith constitutes a breach of treaty
obligations and entails international responsibility. 19
Furthermore, a finding of a breach of a treaty obligation
would not require the establishment of specific causation:
It is important to note that injury or material damage is
not a prerequisite for the existence of a wrongful act, i.e.
for the invocation of State responsibility ... Thus, while a
claimant State must, under the [Draft Articles on State
Responsibility], show a causal relationship between the
activity and the damage caused to be eligible for
reparations . .. the State can, without showing a causal
relationship demand, as long as breach of an international
obligation has taken place. This is in line with customary
law . .. 196
Thus, any UNFSA Party failing to make a good faith
effort to address its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases, given their potential impact on fish species, could be
found to be in violation of the treaty even in the absence of
establishment of specific causation. This breach, in turn,
would impose an obligation on the breaching Party to cease
its wrongful conduct,1 97 which in this context would require a
192. See id. art. 34; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S 331, art. 26; 1.1. Lukashuk, The Principle of'Pacta Sunt Servanda'
and the Nature of Obligation Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513,
513 (1989).
193. Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 62 (1990).
194. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970), Preamble;
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1,
1975, at art. 10, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
195. See Duncan Currie, Whales, Sustainability and International
Environmental Governance, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 45, 53
(2007); see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its Fifty-third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001).
196. VERHEYEN, supra note 151, at 243.
197. See Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 195, art. 30.
64320081
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Party to reduce its emissions below a threshold that would
substantially decrease the risks to interests protected under
UNFSA.
Moreover, even in cases where a Party might seek
damages under UNFSA, the fact that other States may
contribute to climate change need not prove fatal to such an
action. As Verheyen notes, "[t]hat a contribution to the
legally relevant outcome can be sufficient to establish
causation is accepted in many jurisdictions around the world.
.. 19 This includes under the U.S. Restatement of Torts,
which provides that "a conduct or event question is a cause in
fact of the harm if it is a substantial factor in producing it,"
199
as well as under German law, which holds a person
responsible for an increase in risk that manifests in
damages.2 °° Moreover, the International Law Commission
has held that a State can be held liable for reparations in
cases where it has played a "decisive" role in causing an
injury.201
F. Reluctance of Dispute Resolution Bodies to Address
Climate Change
Experience with climate change litigation to date in the
United States, at least, has demonstrated some reluctance on
the part of members of the judiciary to address climate
change issues given their limited scientific expertise.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's flippant but telling
comment during the recent Supreme Court oral arguments in
Massachusetts et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency:2°
2
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . .your assertion is that after the
pollutant leaves the air and goes up into the stratosphere
it is contributing to global warming.
MR. MILKEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the
stratosphere. It's the troposphere.
198. VERHEYEN, supra note 151, at 255.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §431 COMMENT A (1965).
200. See VERHEYEN, supra note 151, at 255.
201. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 2nd Report on State Responsibility, [19891 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/426.
202. No. 05-1120, U.S. Supreme Court, Oral Argument, Nov. 29, 2006,
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/05-
1120.pdf.
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JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you
before I'm not a scientist.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: That's why I don't want to have to
deal with global warming, to tell you the truth. °3
Parties bringing an action before ITLOS or an arbitral
panel might experience similar reservations on the part of the
dispute resolution body to grapple with the complicated
technical issues associated with climate change, especially
since the primary area of expertise of tribunal or panel
members may be more traditional fisheries issues, such as
the impact of harvesting on species. UNFSA provides two
mechanisms to help address this concern. First, in cases
where "a dispute concerns a matter of a technical nature," the
States involved in a dispute may refer the dispute to an "ad
hoc expert panel," which will confer with the Parties and seek
to resolve the dispute without recourse to binding
procedures.2 4 A Party seeking to press a climate change
claim could certainly seek to engage another Party in such
negotiations initially, and should this fail to resolve the
dispute, seek to introduce the panel's scientific findings in a
binding dispute resolution forum. Additionally, if both
Parties agree to it, cases of this nature can be referred to a
"special arbitral panel. 20 5  Under UNCLOS's dispute
resolution provisions in this context, which UNFSA fully
incorporates,201 a panel hearing a climate change-related
dispute could be constituted by experts in the fields of
fisheries, marine environmental protection, marine scientific
research, drawn from the FAO, the United Nations
Environment Program and the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission,2 7 all of whom have expertise on
the nexus of fisheries and climate change. Of course, as
indicated above, this provision of UNFSA can only be invoked
with the consent of both parties. Thus, there is a very good
chance that a party against which a climate action would be
brought would refuse, believing that ITLOS or an arbitral
203. Id. at 23.
204. See UNFSA, supra note 5, art. 29.
205. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
207. See UNCLOS, supra note 126, at Annex VIII, art. 2(1)(2).
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panel might be far less likely to grapple with complicated
science associated with such a case.
Perhaps an even more imposing barrier to a cause of
action under UNFSA may be the perceived threat to the
legitimacy of a dispute resolution body should it enter a
decision against a hegemonic State and that State should
choose to either ignore the decision or drag its feet. As
Strauss observes, international tribunals carefully marshal
their political capital in an effort to preserve and enhance
their legitimacy:
While the official function of international tribunals is to
find the pre-existing law; in reality, for judges to have
their decisions so accepted, they must engage in the
creative process of negotiating the differing global
interests to formulate results that are in accord with the
international community's normative center of gravity. In
arriving at politically viable legal standards, in addition to
formally reviewing submitted briefs and memoranda and
informally reading other legal commentary, judges
engaged in a pragmatic assessment of the political
situation, by factoring in the relative power of the
protagonists and the interests of other important
international actors 208
The primary threat to the legitimacy of a UNFSA dispute
resolution body in the context of climate change may be that a
powerful State would choose to not comply with the decision
given the dramatic policy changes that it might necessitate.
As Silk recently observed, States may choose to not comply
with "binding" decisions when they deem it against their
interests:
In international law, even allegedly binding dispute
settlement mechanisms such as arbitration may be
ignored when a state disagrees with the decision. To
illustrate, in the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile
and Argentina, Argentina challenged the validity of the
arbitrators' decision on dubious grounds and, despite the
implausibility of Argentina's repudiation, the decision was
never enforced . . . . Under UNCLOS, there might be
strong domestic and international pressures to sign a
208. See Andrew Strauss, Toward an International Law of Climate Change:
Utilizing a Model of International Tribunals as Law-Makers, in BURNS &
OSOFSKY, supra note 54.
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fishery agreement regardless of the costs of compliance,
but when the time for compliance comes, narrower
national interests may prevail.2 °9
Indeed, the fear that decisions against the United States
might be ignored may explain the recent decisions of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and World
Heritage Committee to reject petitions to address climate
change.21 °
II. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, the threat of climate change would be
effectively addressed through the international institutional
responses developed in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the specter
of climate change looms larger now than it did a decade ago,
and the prospects for adequate responses within the
UNFCCC framework appear increasingly remote. Now more
than ever, those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change must explore alternatives that may finally galvanize
the major greenhouse emitting States into action. UNFSA is
one option that deserves further exploration.
209. See Richard J. Silk, Jr., Nonbinding Dispute Resolution Processes in
Fisheries Conflicts: Fish Out of Water?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 791, 800-
01 (2001).
210. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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